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OPTIONS TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY
IN NORTH CAROLINA
THOMAS W. CHRISTOPHER*
Land options are often written in an informal manner, without
the parties' having given much thought to the details of the pro-
spective transfer. This may lead to grief for a party to the contract,
for the law of options is technical and occasionally peculiar, and a
party may find that his informality and lack of precision have re-
sulted in his contract's being materially different from what he
had believed it to be, unenforceable, or, indeed, nonexistent. The
purpose of this article is to present in concise form the principles
and rules applicable to options in North Carolina, together with
some discussion of doubtful areas. The article is not intended to
be an exhaustive study, but rather is designed to provide a con-
venient reference for the attorney who is dealing with a particular
problem in this area.
I. DEFINITIONS AND NATURE
An option to buy real property is a right acquired by contract
to accept or reject a present offer to sell.' An option creates a uni-
lateral obligation upon the prospective vendor (maker) to sell on
the conditions agreed, but creates no obligation on the optionee or
holder (prospective buyer) to buy. It does give the latter the right
to exercise the option at his election. If the holder does not exercise
his election by an acceptance, he loses only the consideration paid for
the option.' In effect, an option to buy land amounts to a condi-
tional contract to sell,' although it is important to bear in mind that
*Dean, School of Law, University of New Mexico.
'Clark v. East Lake Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 139, 145, 73 S.E. 793 (1912).
2 Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955).
' Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E. 168 (1914).
An option ... is a contract by which the owner of property agrees with
another that he shall have the right to purchase the same at a fixed price
within a certain time. It is in legal effect an offer to sell, coupled with
an agreement to hold .the offer open for acceptance for the time specified,
such agreement being supported by a valuable consideration, or, at
common law, being under seal, so that it constitutes a binding and ir-
revocable contract to sell if the other party shall elect to purchase within
the time specified.
Id. at 221-22, 81 S.E. at 169.
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there are material differences between an option and a contract for
sale of land. An option does not create an "interest" in the property,
but is, in effect, an offer to convey ;4 this is true even though the offer
is binding. Thus, an optionee has no legal or equitable "interest"
as such in the land. The decisions repeatedly point out that an op-
tion is a unilateral contract.' While an option does not create an
"interest" in the property, it does establish a right that the courts
will enforce. When the optionee accepts in due form, a bilateral
contract for sale is created," and thereupon both parties have in-
terests in the property.
7
II. DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTRACT FOR SALE
The optionee has no "interest" in the land itself, legal or equi-
table, whereas in a contract for sale, both the vendor and the vendee
have "interests" in the land, and both are bound by certain obliga-
tions. An option is not a contract to sell, but it is transformed into
one on acceptance by the optionee.8 The name that the parties give
the written agreement does not determine whether it is an option
or a contract for sale; rather, the nature of the obligations that are
imposed is the determining factor. An agreement by which one
party binds himself to purchase and the other to sell is a "contract
for sale." The fact that the prospective buyer forfeits his deposit
(or consideration) if he does not exercise his option does not make
the transaction a contract for sale, for it is the usual thing for the
consideration to be forfeited if the optionee does not accept. For
'Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954); Carolina
Timber Co. v. Wells, 171 N.C. 262, 88 S.E. 327 (1916). But see Chapman
v. Great W. Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932).
'Parks v. Jacobs, 259 N.C. 129, 129 S.E.2d 884 (1963); Douglass v.
Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955); Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N.C.
703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954); Edwards Lumber & Land Co. v. Smith, 191
N.C. 619, 132 S.E. 593 (1926); Winders v. Kenan, 161 N.C. 628, 77 S.E.
687 (1913); Alston v. Connell, 140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906). For a
discussion of an option as a bilateral contract, see 1A CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 260 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
'Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1938); Byrd v. Freeman, 252 N.C. 724, 114 S.E.2d 715 (1960); Samonds
v. Cloninger, 189 N.C. 610, 127 S.E. 706 (1925).
7 For a general discussion of options, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 11.17 (Casner ed. 1952); IA CORBIN §§ 259-74 (1963); WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §§ 61A-B (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
' See cases cited note 6 supra.
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example, if X pays ten dollars for a thirty-day option and does not
buy, he normally forfeits the ten dollars.
In Davis v. 'artin,9 X agreed to convey certain lands to Y at
two dollars an acre, provided said sum be paid within three years.
Twenty-five dollars was paid at the time "by way of earnest." The
court rejected the argument that this was merely an option.10 In
another case," the agreement stated that A had bought described
land "and doth thereby bind himself, heirs and assigns, at any time
previous to 1 December, 1899, to sell the same to whom P. G. Alston
may direct for $3,502."2 The paper was signed and sealed. The
court ruled that this was an option. Though the results are contrary,
the facts of the two cases are close. In Davis, the money paid is
described as "earnest" and this may be the difference; also the
language in Davis is more like that of a sale-but not much. The
decision in Davis is questionable. However, a contract for sale may
provide for forfeiture on default in an installment, with the buyer's
being released, with no further liability. The fact that the buyer may
be released by his own act does not of itself constitute an option.
In a third case,"3 the agreement stated that X, for and in con-
sideration of fifty dollars, agreed to sell and convey certain real
property to Y for 16,000 dollars, provided that X could give title
and that Y accepted said offer on or before July 5, 1923. This was
held to be an option.'4
146 N.C. 281, 59 S.E. 700 (1907).
"o The paper has all the essential elements of a bond to make title. It
is in no sense a mere option. It is not a continuing offer to sell, but a
complete agreement to sell, accompanied by payment of a part of the
purchase money. . . . The true character of the paper is manifest by
its recital of the receipt of $25 as 'earnest' money, evidently used in the
sense of purchase money. This signifies, not a payment for the privilege
of exercising a future option to buy or not, but a payment of part of
the contract price for the sale of the land.
Id. at 282, 59 S.E. at 700.
" Alston v. Connell, 140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906).
12 Id. at 488, 53 S.E. at 293.
"3 Edwards Lumber & Land Co. v. Smith, 191 N.C. 619, 132 S.E. 593
(1926).
'4 Ibid; Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955);
Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954); Harry's Cadillac-
Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23, 51 S.E.2d 916 (1949); Kluttz v.
Allison, 214 N.C. 379, 199 S.E. 395 (1938); Sitterding v. Grizzard, 114
N.C. 108, 19 S.E. 92 (1894) (contract for sale). For a discussion of the
differences between options and contracts for sale, see 55 Am. Jum. Vendor
& Purchaser § 28 (1946); 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 5 (1955);
Annot., 87 A.L.R. 563 (1933); Annot., 3 A.L.R. 576 (1919).
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III. FIRST REFUSAL
The right of "first refusal" in a lease, deed, or other agreement
may be a binding promise, and it is something like, yet strictly
speaking not, an option. It is not an offer, and it creates no power
of acceptance. The typical situation is where A agrees that B shall
have a right of first refusal at the same price and terms as those of
an offer made by a third person that A is willing to accept. A is
not obligated to sell to anyone, and B has no power to accept unless
'A is willing to accept an offer by a third party. If there is con-
sideration for A's promise, then a valid unilateral contract exists.
For the agreed period, B has a right that A not sell to anyone else
at any price without first offering the property to B at the same
price, and this right is enforceable at law and in equity.'5
First-refusal agreements sometimes are made with respect to
the sale or leasing of land; for example a lease may provide that the
lessee shall have the right of first refusal in renewing the lease.
If lawsuits are to be avoided, it is important to spell out the terms of
the right of first refusal, including the time during which it shall
be in force.
The decision in R. J. Reynolds Realty Co. v. Logan6 indicates
that the North Carolina court is not friendly to such arrangements.
There, the tenant had the right to renew a lease " 'in preference to
a third party at a figure satisfactory to the landlord,' ,1'7 and the
court voided the provision for uncertainty. This result appears
unnecessary, for it is clear that the parties intended that if the
landlord rented to anyone at any price, the tenant should have first
refusal at that price. This is an arrangement that both parties may
desire to make, for adequate business reasons, and there is no good
reason to block it, assuming there is consideration for the promise.
IV. REQUIREMENTS AND FORM
An option to purchase real property must be definite and certain
in its terms. It must adequately describe the property and state the
financial and other terms of the agreement.' 8 It is not necessary
" See Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
1A CorwiN § 261; 7 N.C.L. REv. 474 (1929); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 820
(1949).( 0216 N.C. 26, 3 S.E.2d 280 (1939).
.
7 1d. at 27, 3 S.E.I at 281.
'8 Kelly v. Kelly, 246 N.C. 174, 97 S.E.2d 872 (1957); Harvey v. Linker,
226 N.C. 711, 40 S.E.2d 202 (1946). See Smith v. Joyce, 214 N.C. 602,
200 S.E. 431 (1939).
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that it specify the obligations of each party as such, as long as these
are clear from the context. Thus, the option need not expressly
state that the maker promises to convey, since giving the optionee
the right to purchase necessarily includes an obligation on the
maker to convey.
An option for land must be in writing, and the general require-
ments of the writing are the same as for a contract for sale. Thus,
a later amendment to the memorandum must be signed by the party
to be charged." In Millikan v. Simmons, during the life of a valid
option the parties made a verbal agreement for an extension of
time. A written memorandum, properly signed, was made of this ex-
tension agreement after the time of the original option had expired,
and the court held that this complied with the Statute of Frauds.
The party to be charged (thus, the defendant) must sign the
memorandum, although the position of the signature on the instru-
ment is not important as long as it is affixed for the purpose of
signing." The mark of an illiterate person is sufficient." It is not
necessary that the plaintiff sign. 4 Of course, both parties should
sign, for at the time of the making of the agreement it is not
known which party will be suing.
An option may be cancelled by the parties by parol or abandoned
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953). Millikan v. Simmons, 244 N.C. 195,
93 S.E.2d. 59 (1956); Harvey v. Linker, 226 N.C. 711, 40 S.E.2d 202
(1946) ; Wright v. Allred, 226 N.C. 113, 37 S.E.2d 107 (1946). Options are
subject to the recording statutes.
"0 Harvey v. Linker, supra note 19, where a properly signed memorandum
was later amended but the parties to be charged did not thereafter sign.
But see Harry's Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23, 51 S.E.2d
916 (1949), where after the buyer had signed the contract, the seller
made material changes therein in buyer's presence, and seller then signed.
The fact that the buyer did not re-sign was held not to affect the contract
since he accepted the agreement as changed with knowledge that it was to
be notarized and recorded; this was a ratification and adoption without
affixing another signature.
21244 N.C. 195, 93 S.E.2d 59 (1956).
22 In the Matter of Will of Williams, 234 N.C. 228, 66 S.E.2d 902 (1951)
(signed for another, approved); McCall v. Textile Industrial Institute, 189
N.C. 775, 128 S.E. 349 (1925) (agent may sign); Flowe v. Hartwick, 167
N.C. 448, 83 S.E. 841 (1914); Burriss v. Starr, 165 N.C. 657, 81 S.E. 929
(1914) ; Proctor v. Finley, 119 N.C. 536, 26 S.E. 128 (1896). With regard
to signing on behalf of corporations, see McCall v. Textile Industrial Insti-
tute, supra; Neaves v. North State Mining Co., 90 N.C. 412 (1884). On
signing for municipal corporations, see Wade v. City of New Bern, 77
N.C. 460 (1877).
" Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N.C. 134, 12 S.E. 902 (1891).
2" Clegg v. Bishop, 188 N.C. 564, 125 S.E. 122 (1924) ; Lewis v. Murray,
177 N.C. 17, 97 S.E. 750 (1919); Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N.C. 183, 49
S.E. 104 (1904); Mizell v. Burnett, 49 N.C. 249 (1857).
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by acts or matters in pais.25 Acceptance of the offer by the optionee
may be by parol, except when the option agreement provides other-
wise. -0
Death or insanity of the owner of the land does not terminate
the option if there is consideration, as the obligations of the option
are not personal.2 7  The courts sometimes speak of options as
covenants running with the land.28 If there is neither consideration
nor a seal, the death or insanity of the owner of the land apparently
terminates the "option," since without consideration or a seal there
would be no option in the true sense of the term, but merely a re-
vocable offer.20 Hence, the situation would be analogous to an
offer in any bilateral contract situation where, if the offeror dies
"Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 69 S.E.2d 557 (1952); Bell v. Brown,
227 N.C. 319, 42 S.E.2d 92 (1947). "[I]n the absence of mutual agreement,
an abandonment, or waiver . . . is to be inferred only from such positive
and unequivocal acts and conduct as are clearly inconsistent with the con-
tract." Id. at 322, 42 S.E.2d at 94. May v. Getty, 140 N.C. 310, 53 S.E. 75
(1905); Holden v. Purefoy, 108 N.C. 163, 12 S.E. 848 (1891).
" Kottler v. Martin, 241 N.C. 369, 85 S.E.2d 314 (1955); Trodgen v.
Williams, 144 N.C. 192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907). Such oral acceptance binds
the maker. However, under the Statute of Frauds, it does not bind the
optionee. Hence, if the maker is suing the optionee, the acceptance must
meet the written requirements, including signature, of the Statute of Frauds.
IA CORBIN, § 264. It is usually held that an acceptance must in fact be
received by the maker in order to create a bilateral contract. Edwards
Lumber & Land Co. v. Smith, 191 N.C. 619, 132 S.E. 593 (1926); Hudson
v. Cozart, 179 N.C. 247, 102 S.E. 278 (1920) (tender to one tenant in
common binds all); Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E. 168 (1914);
Gaylord v. McCoy, 161 N.C. 685, 77 S.E. 959 (1913); Winders v. Kenan,
161 N.C. 628, 77 S.E. 687 (1913); Bateman v. Kramer Lumber Co., 154
N.C. 248, 70 S.E. 474 (1911) (acceptance and tender must be made to
present owner if land has been sold); Trogden v. Williams, supra; 1A
CORBIN § 264. Where acceptance is expected by mail, contrary to the general
rule that mailing by the offeree binds the contract, it may be that in options
the maker must receive the acceptance in order for a bilateral contract to be
in force, and the contract thus dates from the date of receipt. See IA
CORnIN § 264 at 521.
2' First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d
367 (1946); Mizell v. Dennis Simmons Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 68, 93 S.E.
436 (1917); Barbee v. Greenberg, 144 N.C. 430, 57 S.E. 125 (1907).
RESTATEFNT, CONTRACTS § 46 (1932); 1 CORBIN § 54; Annot., 148 A.L.R.
172 (1944).
" First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d
367 (1946) ; Bank of Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N.C. 341, 77 S.E. 222 (1913);
Barbee v. Greenberg, 144 N.C. 430, 57 S.E. 125 (1907).
"Waters v. Security Life & Annuity Co., 144 N.C. 663, 57 S.E. 437
(1907). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 48-9 (1932); 1 WILLISTON § 62;
1 CORBIN § 54. Is it necessary that the optionee have notice of the death or
insanity prior to his acceptance? The answer appears to be in the negative.
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 48 (1932); 1 WILLISTON §§ 62-62A; 1 CORBIN
§ 54.
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before the offeree accepts and nothing else is involved, the offer
terminates.8" An interesting situation would arise where the offeree
accepts without knowledge of the offeror's prior death, and then the
offeror's personal representative seeks to hold the offeree. It is
thought that the same result would follow-no liability due to the
offer's termination on the offeror's death.
31
What is the effect on the option if improvements on the property
are destroyed prior to acceptance? The general rule appears to be
that the owner is not required to replace the improvements, and
the optionee is not entitled to an abatement of the option price .
2
This is because an optionee does not have an interest in the land,
and acceptance does not relate back to the date of the offer.
3
A more troublesome problem arises where the property is de-
stroyed after acceptance but before the deed is delivered by the
vendor. After acceptance, a bilateral contract of sale exists be-
tween the vendor and the optionee, and it is clear that the rules for
contract for sale apply. If the common-law rule that the buyer in
a contract for sale must bear the loss34 absent a contrary agreement
is in force, the optionee-vendee is bound, and he bears the loss. This
raises questions because in a formal contract for sale the parties
normally use a detailed form or contract-often printed-which
provides for various situations, whereas in an option the agreement
is more likely to be a very short statement in which the parties do
not work out details or anticipate contingencies. Hence, the lawyer
'0 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 48 (1932).
31See 1 CORBIN § 54; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 48 (1932).
2 See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.17 (Casner ed. 1952); 1A
CORBIN § 272 (insurance). If the owner collects insurance on the destroyed
improvements, it seems that the optionee is not entitled to have this applied
toward the purchase price. This is a harsh rule, although the optionee has
the remedy of not exercising the option; but if he has paid valuable consider-
ation for the option, he loses it. On recovery of consideration paid for
option when improvements destroyed, see Perlee v. Jeffcott, 89 N.J.L. 34,
97 Atl. 789 (1916). Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1225 (1923) (optionee's right to have
insurance applied on purchase price). See also Poole v. Scott, 228 N.C. 464,
46 S.E.2d 145 (1948).
" In a contract of sale, the vendee has an interest in the land, and he is
liable for loss; by statute he may be relieved of this liability. The optionee
apparently cannot hold the maker responsible for the loss either at common
law or by statute, and he cannot abate the price. His remedy is to elect not
to accept the option. See Caldwell v. Frazier, 65 Kan. 24, 68 Pac. 1076
(1902); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.84 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 id. §
11.17; Annot., 148 A.L.R. 172 (1944).
"'See 7 WILmsToN § 928; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.30
(Casner ed. 1952).
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should give the same care to drafting an option that he does a
contract for sale.
North Carolina has changed the common-law rule for contracts
for sale by General Statutes section 39-39, and the risk of loss is
now generally on the vendor unless the vendee has either legal title
or possession; the vendee in such case may recover any portion
of the purchase price he has paid . 5 Consequently, it would appear
that in North Carolina, where the buildings are destroyed after the
acceptance but before the optionee has either legal title (under the
contract for sale he has only equitable title) or possession, the
maker or owner must bear the loss.
In tendering payment, may the optionee reduce the amount to
be tendered by the amount of an existing mortgage or similar en-
cumbrance? Unless it appears that the understanding is otherwise,
it seems that in some cases such abatement may be made by the
optionee50 Technically, if the option is for a clear title, the optionee
would tender the full amount and demand a good deed, free of
encumbrances; and it would be up to the maker to meet the obliga-
tion to give a clear title. As a practical matter, if the optionee is
willing to attend to the encumbrance himself, there is no reason
not to hold the maker upon tender of the abated sum (agreed price
less value of encumbrances), at least when the encumbrance is a
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-39 (Supp. 1963).
Risk of loss. Any contract hereafter made in this State for the purchase
and sale of realty shall be interpreted as including an agreement that
the parties shall have the following rights and duties, unless the contract
expressly provides otherwise:
(1) If, when neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject
matter of the contract has been transferred, all or a material
part thereof is destroyed without fault of the purchaser, the
vendor cannot enforce the contract, and the purchaser is entitled
to recover any portion of the price that he has paid;
(2) If, when either the legal title or the possession of the subject
matter of the contract has been transferred, all or any part thereof
is destroyed without fault of the vendor, the purchaser is not
thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled
to recover any portion thereof that he has paid.
"See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 364-65 (1932); 3 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY § 11.61 (Casner ed. 1952); 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser
§§ 259(d), 263, 265 (1955); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1020 (1962); Annot., 148
A.L.R. 292 (1944) (dower); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1078 (1926) (outstanding
title); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1253, 1379, 1508 (1928); Annot., 46 A.L.R. 748
(1926). Payments made to obtain the option ordinarily do not count as
part of the purchase price. See 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 270 (1955).
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mortgage or some other item that the maker doubtless had in mind
when he set the price.3 7 But it may be argued that if some lesser
type of encumbrance appears (e.g., dower, determinable fee) and
if the maker is not bound to deliver good title (i.e., if he has agreed
to deliver good title only if he can), then it would be unjust to
force him to sell at the abated price; some courts do not grant
specific performance at an abated price against the vendor where a
dower interest is involved.38
A statement of the price to be paid for the land is an essential
ingredient of the option. Normally this is accomplished merely
by stating the price and the terms, but it may be enough if the
option provides a manner in which the price may be fixed with
certainty.39 An option to renew at the highest rental offered by
"'Farmers Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Eastern Carolina Warehouse
Corp., 185 N.C. 518, 117 S.E. 625 (1923). Where vendor sought specific
performance, the court wrote:
And in reference to appellants second position as to encumbrances,
while the existence of an encumbrance inherent in the property as an
easement, substantially impairing its value, or a moneyed lien for a
substantial sum, unknown at the time of the contract or indeterminate
in amount has been held to interfere with the conveyance of a marketable
title (particularly where there is an express covenant against encum-
brances), a mortgage or deed of trust to secure a definite sum of
money, which is known to exist at the time of the contract, is not re-
garded as such an encumbrance in the strict sense of the term, nor will
its existence always justify an avoidance of the agreement on the part
of the vendee. Thus, where it is made to appear before a court . . .
that the encumbrance complained of is less than the purchase price,
or where, being a docketed judgment, the amount has been amply
secured on appeal in the case, or where, being of small, proportional
amount, full and adequate protection can be afforded, it is held that
specific performance will be enforced, the decree making proper pro-
vision for the relief of the property. A position especially insistent
where the vendee has gone into possession fully aware of the alleged
encumbrance and has been exercising over the property full control
as owner.
Id. at 526, 117 S.E. at 628. See also Sutton v. Davis, 143 N.C. 474, 55
S.E. 844 (1906).
" See 49 Am. JuR. Specific Performaiwe §§ 112-13 (1943); Annot., 46
A.L.R. 748 (1927); Annot., 148 A.L.R. 292 (1944). In Bethell v. McKinney,
164 N.C. 71, 80 S.E. 162 (1913), A contracted to sell land to B, the contract
containing an agreement against encumbrances. B knew that A was married.
The court held that B was entitled to specific performance, with an
abatement in price for dower. Farthing v. Rochelle, 131 N.C. 563, 45 S.E.
1 (1902) (no abatement for dower when vendee knew vendor married);
Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N.C. 304 (1886) (where vendee did not know
vendor was married, abatement for dower allowed)." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.82 (Casner ed. 1952).
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anyone would appear to meet the test.40 In McAdoo v. Callum4 1
the lease provided that the tenant should have the refusal of the
premises for another year, and the court held that he could have the
premises on the same terms as the year before. But merely to state
"at a price to be agreed on" is usually held to be invalid.4' It may
be satisfactory to provide for the price to be fixed by arbitration
if the terms of the arbitration arrangements are specified, but some
courts will not grant specific performance in such cases. The posi-
tion of North Carolina is in doubt because of a lack of recent de-
cisions, with the older decisions being unfavorable toward en-
forcement of arbitration agreements; but it is hoped that the supreme
court will look with favor on such an arrangement, for arbitration
is a device of great social utility today.43 Where the terms of the
arbitration arrangement are reasonably certain, there is much to be
said for granting specific performance.
The terms of payment need not be set out in great detail, but
they should be clear. Where no terms are stated, it would seem
that the contract should be interpreted to mean payment in cash,
since this would be in accord with common practice.
o See Bettens v. Hoover, 12 Cal. App. 313, 107 Pac. 329 (1909). In
Crotts v. Thomas, 226 N.C. 385, 38 S.E.2d 158 (1946), the option obligated
the maker to sell at a price to be agreed upon but not to exceed a stated
sum. The court held that the optionee may accept at that stated sum without
further negotiation.
4186 N C. 419 (1882).
"R. J. Reynolds Realty Co. v. Logan, 216 N.C. 26, 3 S.E.2d 280 (1939).
Here, the tenant had the right to renew "in preference to a third party at
a figure satisfactory to the landlord." The provision was held void for un-
certainty. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 572 (1924); Annot., 68 A.L.R. 157
(1930); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1237 (1947); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 448 (1949).
"See Maas Bros. v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625, 286 N.W. 104 (1939);
Kaufmann v. Liggett, 209 Pa. 87, 58 Atl. 129 (1904); Brownell v. Burling-
ton Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 115 Vt. 455, 63 A.2d 862 (1949). Some courts,
especially in older decisions, have held that the arbitration agreements are
valid but that specific performance will not lie; even so, some of these
courts give equitable relief very close to specific performance. See Norfleet
v. Southall, 7 N.C. 189 (1819) (where arbitration agreed upon by contract
failed, court would not substitute its judgment); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 727
(1947). There is no reason today why equity should not enforce an arbi-
tration agreement as to price in an option where the arbitration or appraisal
clause is not the essence of the contract, or where the parties may easily be
returned to the status quo. Thus, specific performance should be granted
in lease-renewal situations. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 572, 580 (1924); Annot.,
167 A.L.R. 741-49 (1947). N.C. GrN. STAT. § 1-544 (1953) appears not
to be relevant to these cases, since it refers only to existing disputes. Skinner
v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951); Sturges, Arbitration
Under the New North Carolina Arbitration Statute, 6 N.C.L. REv. 363
(1928).
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Must there be consideration for an option? If there is no con-
sideration, the maker is free to withdraw the offer at any time
prior to acceptance; but if the optionee properly accepts prior to
a withdrawal of the offer and within the time provided, the maker
is bound.44 Notice of the withdrawal must be given to the optionee,
and oral notice is sufficient.4 An interesting situation would arise
if the maker withdraws and the optionee accepts at the same time;
perhaps the optionee would prevail since he accepted before with-
drawal.4" If there is consideration and the option is otherwise valid,
the maker is bound for the time of the option and cannot withdraw
the offer.
47
What consideration is required for specific performance? North
Carolina follows the common law and accepts a seal in lieu of con-
sideration.4" The rationale for accepting the seal is not clear, but
the decisions say either (1) the seal conclusively imports considera-
tion, or (2) the solemnity of the act of sealing imports such re-
flection and care that a consideration is regarded as unnecessary.4
At law, then, a seal is enough to make a valid contract. Would the
seal be sufficient in equity, for example, in an action for specific
performance? Equity generally looks beyond form and ordinarily
will refuse to exert its powers in aid of a sealed instrument except
when there is a valuable consideration."° Thus, in the absence of
such consideration, specific performance may be denied. But options
to purchase do not come within this rule. Equity will enforce op-
"Kottler v. Martin, 241 N.C. 369, 85 S.E.2d 314 (1955); Atkinson v.
Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945); Thomason v. Bescher, 176
N.C. 622, 97 S.E. 654 (1918); Winders v. Kenan, 161 N.C. 628, 77 S.E.
687 (1913); Bryant Timber Co. v. Wilson, 151 N.C. 154, 65 S.E. 932
(1909). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 34-5 (1932).
" See cases cited note 44 supra; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 41 (1932);
1 CoR.IN § 67; 1 WLISTON §§ 56-57. What if optionee receives informa-
tion from third parties that maker has sold property or that property has
been destroyed? See RESTATEMENT, CoNTAwcTs § 42 (1932); 1 WILLisTO N
§ 57; 1 CORBIN § 40.
" See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 41 (1932).
"Crotts v. Thomas, 226 N.C. 385, 38 S.E.2d 158 (1946); Thomason
v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 97 S.E. 654 (1918); Gaylord v. McCoy, 161
N.C. 685, 77 S.E. 959 (1913); Bryant Timber Co. v. Wilson, 151 N.C.
154, 65 S.E. 932 (1909).
4" Crotts v. Thomas, supra note 47; Samonds v. Cloninger, 189 N.C. 610,
127 S.E. 706 (1925) ; Thomason v. Bescher, supra note 47; Ward v. Albert-
son, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E. 168 (1914).
" See Thomason v. Bescher, supra note 47; MORDECAI, LAW LEcTu~ s
931-33 (1907)..0 See note 49 supra. See also Woodall, v. Prevatt, 45 N.C. 199 (1853).
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tions under seal even though there is no valuable consideration.51
The reasoning is as follows: The seal is enough to keep the option
open; on acceptance within the time provided, a bilateral contract is
constituted, and in an action for specific performance, "the con-
sideration is not restricted to the seal or the nominal amount usually
present in these bargains, but extends to and includes the purchase
price agreed upon." 2
A nominal amount of money is sufficient to support specific
performance of an option.0 In Thomason v. Bescher, the court
stated :
We are not unmindful of the position that in equity causes the
Court looks beyond the form and will usually refuse to exert its
powers in aid of a sealed instrument, its collection and enforce-
ment, except when there is a valuable consideration. . . . But
these options, containing a continuing offer to sell and consti-
tuting a contract, binding on the parties because in the form of
a covenant under seal, serve their purpose in keeping the offer
open for the time specified and preventing a withdrawal by the
vendor. On acceptance and offer to perform within the time, a
bilateral contract is then constituted which, on breach, is en-
forcible by appropriate remedies, legal or equitable. And in case
of action for specific performance, the consideration is not re-
stricted to the seal or the nominal amount usually present in these
bargains, but extends to and includes the purchase price agreed
upon. 4
" See cases cited note 48 supra. See also 1A CoRBnN § 263; Annot.,
2 A.L.R. 631 (1919); Annot., 21 A.L.R. 137 (1922).
"Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 627, 97 S.E. 654, 655-56 (1918).
See cases cited note 48 supra.
"' In reference to the $5 paid by plaintiff as the consideration for his
interest, it is the accepted position, in this State, that a "binding contract
to convey land, where there has been no fraud, mistake, undue influence,
or oppression, will be specifically enforced, and, as a rule, the mere
inadequacy of price, without more, will not affect the application of
the principle" . . . and where the contract has been perfected by ac-
ceptance within the time or proper tender of performance, on suit for
specific performance, the real consideration is the contract price, which
must be paid before the interest is finally acquired, in this instance the
$1,000, and, as to the option itself, which only provides for holding the
privilege open for a short period of time and involving also the oppor-
tunity to effect a sale by the potential vendor, the $5 paid may very
properly be held as a sufficient consideration to bind the party . . . and
there is high authority for the position that, in States where this matter
has not been regulated by statute, the seal itself conclusively imports a
consideration.
Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 222-23, 81 S.E. 168, 170 (1914).
0' 176 N.C. 622, 626-27, 97 S.E. 654, 655-56 (1918).
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A clause in a lease that gives the lessee an option to buy the
property or to renew the lease is binding as far as consideration is
concerned, since the lease itself is consideration. 5 Such a clause is
thus irrevocable.
V. ESTOPPEL
Consideration makes an option, which is otherwise sufficient,
irrevocable for the time provided. An option may also be irrevocable
due to an estoppel. In fact, estoppel may in certain cases take the
place of both consideration and a writing.
In Alston v. Connell,' A gave B an option, in writing and for
consideration, to purchase land. B was ready to exercise the option,
but at A's request he delayed doing so until the period had expired.
In a suit by B, the court held that A could not plead the Statute of
Frauds and that B was entitled to specific performance. This is a
sound decision.5 7 In Dixson v. C. E. Johnson Realty Co.,58 a written
option for consideration gave the buyer of land the right to reconvey
the land within one year and obtain a refund of his money. Within
the year, the buyer demanded refund of his money under the option,
and on oral request of the seller, the buyer orally agreed to delay
for a year. During the new period the buyer repeated his demand.
In the buyer's action, the seller pleaded the Statute of Frauds.
The court held for the buyer, saying it would not permit the seller
to repudiate his obligations and rely on the Statute of Frauds.
In Johnson v. Noles, 9 the maker orally and without further
consideration extended the time for tender by the optionee so that
" Kottler v. Martin, 241 N.C. 369, 85 S.E.2d 314 (1955); Sandlin v.
Weaver, 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954); First Citizens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367 (1946); Crotts v. Thomas, 226
N.C. 385, 38 S.E.2d 158 (1946); Bateman v. Kramer Lumber Co., 154
N.C. 248, 70 S.E. 474 (1911).
140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906).
The extension having been given at Thomas Connell's request and for
his convenience, when the extended agreement itself and all the cir-
cumstances clearly implied that he regarded it as a valid and binding
contract and that he intended to live up to its terms, the law will not
permit him now to repudiate its obligations, invoke for his protection the
statute of frauds and defeat the plaintiff's recovery, who has forborne a
timely performance by reason of Thomas Connell's request and in
reasonable reliance on his assurance.
Id. at 491-92, 53 S.E. at 294.
See 2 CoRBiN § 310; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 224 (1932).58209 N.C. 354, 183 S.E. 382 (1936).
z9224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E.2d 637 (1944).
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the former could give a good deed with covenants, which he could
not do when the extension was granted. The court said that the
extension was for the maker's benefit and at his request, and that
he would not be heard to plead the Statute of Frauds.
These situations are somewhat similar to what is termed promis-
sory estoppel, but in reality they are not the same. Section 90 of
the Restatement of Contracts describes promissory estoppel (but
without using the term) as: "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of promisee and which does in-
duce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." Promissory estoppel normally
takes the place of consideration, but some cases also invoke it as a
means of enforcing contracts that otherwise are unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds.60 The estoppel raised in Alston
arises where the plaintiff has failed to meet a necessary condition
precedent to the defendant's duty under the contract and that failure
was brought about by the defendant himself. In this situation,
the plaintiff can have judgment based on the contract without
meeting the condition. Of course, it must be shown that, but for
the defendant's request or other conduct, the plaintiff would have
fulfilled the condition. Thus, if the plaintiff-optionee fails to
tender within the time specified in the option because of a request of
the defendant-maker, and if the plaintiff-optionee was ready, willing,
and able to tender within the time and forbore solely at the defen-
dant's request, then the defendant cannot be heard to say that his
promise was oral or that it was without consideration.
The remarkable thing about these holdings is that North Caro-
lina is one of the few states that refuse to honor part performance
as taking an oral contract for sale of land out of the Statute of
Frauds." The buyer has been misled to his detriment by the
owner's bad conduct in both situations, and there is less risk of
perjury in the part-performance situation.
" For discussion of promissory estoppel, see 1A CORBIN § 194; 1 WILLIs-
TOI' § 140; 19 Am. JuR. Estoppel § 53 (1939); Annot., 115 A.L.R. 152
(1938); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956). See Stevens v. Turlington,
186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923) (where a purchaser of land relied on
oral promise of mortgagee to release land, it was held to estop the mortgagee).
O, Duckett v. Harrison, 235 N.C. 145, 69 S.E.2d 176 (1952).
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VI. LACHrES
In Ritter v. Chandler,"' the optionee accepted the offer in due
form, but waited more than ten years to demand specific perfor-
mance, making no claim on the property in the meantime. The owner
rented to others and finally sold to a third party. The court held
that the optionee was barred by laches. Long delay, the court said,
accompanied by acts inconsistent with a purpose of performing a
contract will, if there is no waiver, bar the buyer's bringing specific
performance. In an early case, where the owner had made improve-
ments, the optionee was barred after six years.6 3 The principle
applied in these cases is a sound one. Lapse of time alone generally
is not enough to invoke laches, but lapse taken with other circum-
stances may be sufficient. With only one or two possible exceptions,
the North Carolina cases in this area have involved lapse of time
and acts showing either abandonment or change in position.4
VII. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
As a rule, future interests in land reserved in the grantor are
not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, for the reversion,
the resulting trust, the power of termination, and the possibility
of reverter are not covered by the rule. A grantor may also retain
an interest of sorts by reserving an option in the land, and in theory
this would seem to be similar to other types of retained interests,
but it is settled that the option contract is subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities. It makes no difference whether the grantor
keeps the option and parts with the land, or keeps the land and giveg
an option. If the option to purchase land is in gross, and thus is
not appendant to a leasehold estate, and if it can be exercised be-
°'214 N.C. 703, 200 S.E. 398 (1939).
' Francis v. Love, 56 N.C. 321 (1857). See May v. Getty, 140 N.C.
310, 53 S.E. 75 (1905) (acts by buyer and long delay) ; Beattie v. Carolina
Cent. R.R., 108 N.C. 425, 12 S.E. 913 (1891); Holden v. Purefoy, 108
N.C. 163, 12 S.E. 848 (1891); Love v. Welch, 97 N.C. 200, 2 S.E. 242
(1887) (thirty-year delay); Faw v. Whittington, 72 N.C. 321 (1875) (mere
lalpse of time alone not enough); McGalliard v. Aikins, 37 N.C. 186
(1842) (twenty years and acts by the plaintiff showing abandonment);
Strickland v. Fowler, 21 N.C. 629 (1837) (nine years and change of posi-
tion); Tate v. Conner, 17 N.C. 224 (1832) (thirty-four years-the decision
appears to have been based primarily on the long delay).
" See cases cited note 63 su pra. See generally 5A CoRBin §§ 1167,
1177; 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 930 (1958).
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yond the period of the rule, it is void. Thus, in a Georgia decision,
an option in a deed to the grantee, its successors, and assigns, giving
a perpetual right and option to purchase certain other land with no
time limit and binding the grantor, his heirs, and assigns, was held
to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 5
In the North Carolina case of Hardy Bros. v. Galloway," the
deed provided that the grantors retained for themselves, their heirs,
and assigns the right to repurchase the land "when sold." The
court found several faults with this, including the fact that price
was not agreed on. It also held that since the right to repurchase
was of indefinite duration as to time, it was a void restriction on
alienation. 1
Another North Carolina decision makes an exception to this
rule. In Pure Oil Co. v. Baars0 at the time of delivery of the deed
the grantor received a written option to repurchase at any time
within a year, with automatic renewal from year to year, subject
to cancellation on sixty days notice prior to the end of a current
period. The court in effect enforced the option. One of the grounds
was that "the option is an integral part of the transaction, and it
would be inequitable to allow the defendants to claim the property
under deed ... and at the same time annul the essential terms of its
acquisition. If the option is to go out, so must the deed which
induced it." ' The Restatement of Property adopts the North Caro-
lina position, citing the Pure Oil decision as the sole basis. The
Restatement reads:
An option to repurchase the whole or any part of the interest
conveyed is necessarily only one ingredient in the entire trans-
action between the parties. If this ingredient is so essential a part
of the entire agreement that the parties would not have made
the agreement, if they had known of the option's invalidity, then
the failure of the option is a sufficient basis for appropriate pro-
ceedings to rescind the entire transaction and to restore each of
the partners to the situation in which he was before the trans-
action was made.70
STurner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870, 113 S.E. 585 (1922).
111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
' This decision is put more on the ground that the option was a re-
straint on a fee rather than on perpetuity grounds, but it does indicate that
the N.C. courts frown on permanent options.
0 224 N.C. 612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944).
°Id. at 615, 31 S.E.2d at 856.
,REsTATE !ENT, PROPERTY § 394, comment f (Supp. 1948).
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Where it is clear that the maker would want the entire trans-
action to be voided if the option is void, this holding is sound. And
the facts in Pure Oil do make this reasonably clear. But this ex-
ception should be applied only in exceptional circumstances. A
better way to handle the Pure Oil situation would be for the court
to hold that the option should last only for the grantor's lifetime,
if that is possible, and thus avoid the perpetuities rule. In this way
the transaction would stand, and in many cases the needs and wishes
of the parties would be fully served.
It has long been established that an option to renew the lease in
a lease for years is not subject to the rule. Thus, if X leases Black-
acre to Y for ninety-nine years, with a covenant for perpetual re-
newal, such provision is good, and specific performance lies. Ac-
cording to Simes the better explanation for this is that such a
covenant aids rather than hinders alienability, since it is an accepted
commercial device used in disposing of real estate.1 This rationale
works well if the lease is for a long term-for example, ninety-nine
years; but if the lease is for a short term, the reasoning loses its
appeal, for the same rationale then works for any option: options in
general are accepted commercial devices which assist in making land
saleable. Gray's explanation that the covenant to renew is part
of the lessee's present interest, and so is "vested," may well be a
more suitable explanation.7" But, as Gray admits, the real explana-
tion seems to be simply that this is an exception to the Rule Against
Perpetuities because a long line of decisions have said it is."3 Like-
wise, an option to purchase contained in a lease is held not to fall
within the rule in the United States if the option is to be exercised
within the term of the lease.74
When an option is held void as violating the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the question remains as to how the rest of the instru-
ment is affected. It may be that the option alone will be excised,
leaving the remainder of the instrument as it is; it may be that the
' SIMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1244 (1956).
7 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 231 (4th ed. 1942). Gray points
out that the option must be in the control of those having vested interests
under the lease. Thus, if a lease for years gives the lesee and his heirs a
perpetual right of renewal, with a limitation over to M and his heirs if
the lessee's children all die under age twenty-five, then the devise to M is
bad.7 1Id. at 233-34.
" See SImEs & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 71, at 162.
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entire instrument will be voided, as was discussed in the Pure Oil
decision.71
Almost no North Carolina authority exists on the Rule Against
Perpetuities as applied to options, but no reason appears why the
state would not follow the general trend in this country, as stated
by Simes and in the Restatement of Property.7
VIII. EXERCISE OF OPTION
Except where the agreement provides otherwise, an oral ac-
ceptance of a valid option to purchase land binds the maker when
the optionee sues the maker, since the person being charged has
signed a memorandum. But an oral acceptance does not bind the
optionee where the maker is suing him, since the person to be
charged is the optionee and a written acceptance signed by him is
necessary under the Statute of Frauds.7 It is usually held that the
acceptance must in fact be received by the maker for the bilateral
contract to come into effect.78 The acceptance must be unqualified;
variation of the terms thereof constitutes merely a new offer.79
A. Time of Essence
If no time limit for acceptance is stated, courts generally hold
that the option must be exercised within a reasonable time. ° If
the option is in a lease and is silent as to time, it is presumed that
"' Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C. 612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944); Hardy
Bros. v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
"'For a discussion of application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
options, see SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 71, at § 1244; GRAY, op.
cit. supra note 72, at §§ 230-30.3; REsTATEmENT, PROPERTY §§ 393-95
(1944); 6 AmERICA LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.56-.57 (Casner ed. 1952);
POWELL, op. cit. supra note 64, at § 771; Annot., 162 A.L.R. 581 (1946);
Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1145 (1939); Annot., 3 A.L.R. 498 (1919).
See cases cited note 24 supra.
,8 See cases cited note 24 supra.
Clark v. East Lake Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 139, 73 S.E. 793 (1912).
See also Hudson v. Cozart, 179 N.C. 247, 102 S.E. 278 (1920), where it
was held that to obtain specific performance, the optionee must aver that he
has complied with all the terms; tender alone is not enough if the contract
sets out other requirements.
"°Lewis v. Allred, 249 N.C. 486, 106 S.E.2d 689 (1959); Sandlin v.
Weaver, 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954) (a delay of eleven years was
too long); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945);
Ritter v. Chandler, 214 N.C. 703, 200 S.E. 398 (1939) ; Trogden v. Williams,
144 N.C. 192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907). If it appears that the parties intended
that the option remain open indefinitely, then the option may be held void as
violating the Rule Against Perpetuities.
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the option may be exercised at any time during the existence of the
lease."' If a duration for the option is specified then time is of
the essence. 2 This means that a thirty-day option must be exercised
within thirty days. Normally, time is not of the essence in a con-
tract for the sale of land. However, since an option, unlike a con-
tract for sale, is unilateral, it is construed strictly in favor of the
maker;" therefore the optionee must adhere strictly to all the
terms, including the time limit. However, an extension of time for
acceptance granted by the maker for his own convenience, even
though orally given, may be binding on him.84
In a lease containing an option to renew or to buy, where the
lessee has made valuable improvements in expectation of exercising
the power and then has forgotten (or failed due to mistake or acci-
dent) to give notice until a few days after the specified time, some
courts have granted specific performance. But even here, if the delay
is long or if the lessor has reasonably changed his position, the
court may refuse relief to the lessee.8 5
81 See Atlantic Prod. Co. v. Dunn, 142 N.C. 471, 55 S.E. 299 (1906);
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367
(1946). Annot., 37 AL.R. 1245 (1925); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 711 (1946);
Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 878 (1949); 1 AMERICAN LAW PROPERTY § 3.83
(Casner ed. 1952).
82 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1938); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Medford, 258 N.C. 146, 128 S.E.2d
141 (1962); Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d 258 (1955);
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945) ; Gaylord v. Mc-
Coy, 161 N.C. 685, 77 S.E. 959 (1913); Winders v. Kenan, 161 N.C. 628,
77 S.E. 687 (1913); Bateman v. Kramer Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 248, 70
S.E. 474 (1911); Davis v. Martin, 146 N.C. 281, 59 S.E. 700 (1907);
Trogden v. Williams, 144 N.C. 192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907) ; Alston v. Connell,
140 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906).
'a Winders v. Kenan, 161 N.C. 628, 77 S.E. 687 (1913). "The acceptance
must be according to the terms of the contract, and if these require the pay-
ment of the purchase money . . . precedent to the exercise of the right to
buy, the money must be paid or tendered, and a mere notice of an intention
to buy or that the party will take the property does not change the relations
of the parties . . . ." Id. at 633-34, 77 S.E. at 689.
" In Millikan v. Simmons, 244 N.C. 195, 93 S.E.2d 59 (1956), an
agreement to extend the option period made orally during the original
period, but reduced to writing and signed after time expired was held to
be valid. In Wagner v. Consolidated Realty Corp., 210 N.C. 1, 185 S.E.
421 (1936), a letter by the vendor to his agent extending the time, which
letter was shown to the vendee by the agent, was held to be a waiver, giving
the vendee a reasonable time thereafter in which to accept. If the seller
makes himself inaccessible on the option date, it may be that optionee will
gain an extension. See Harry's Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C.
23, 51 S.E.2d 916 (1949).
8 See Gloyd v. Midwest Ref. Co., 62 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1933); 5
CoRBiN § 1177.
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B. Tender
Whether tender is necessary in order to constitute acceptance
depends on the agreement; keep in mind that the option is construed
in favor of the maker. Where tender is construed to be a condition
of acceptance, strict adherence is necessary. In one case, 6 the
option stated that "$2,000 of [the purchase price] ... is to be paid
1 April, 1905,"Ms and the court held that tender of 2,000 dollars
was necessary for acceptance. Another case"8 held tender to be
necessary where the option provided that if the optionees shall,
within the time specified, elect to purchase, then they shall pay
one-half cash. In another decision, 9 tender was necessary when
the option required that A pay to parties of first part in cash 5,000
dollars on a specified date. In another caseP° involving a sale of
timber with two years to remove, the agreement provided: "[I]n
the event [the purchasers] . . . do not get it off in that time they
shall have one year's time thereafter in which to remove the same
by paying to the party of the first part interest on the purchase
money for said extension of time."'" The court held that tender of
the interest was necessary in order to accept the extension.
92
If tender is not a condition of acceptance, it follows that it is
not necessary for acceptance. In one case,9 3 the option stated that
"the said vendors will sell . . . the land in question at $8.50 per
acre, the acreage to be ascertained by a survey to be made by the
Department of Agriculture. '94  The court held that since the
survey, as well as other conditions, was to be performed after
acceptance, no tender was required for acceptance. Where an
option 5 read that the lessee "may at any time during the term
0 Winders v. Kenan, 161 N.C. 628, 77 S.E. 687 (1913).
' Id. at 629, 77 S.E. at 688.,Trogden v. Williams, 144 N.C. 192, 56 S.E. 865 (1907).
SHudson v. Cozart, 179 N.C. 247, 102 S.E. 278 (1920)."oBateman v. Kramer Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 248, 70 S.E. 474 (1911).
01 Id. at 249-50, 70 S.E. at 474.
"' See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Medford, 258 N.C. 146, 128
S.E.2d 141 (1962), where the optionee had thirty days and the terms read
"Cash in full at the end of 30 days . . . ." The court held that a tender
was required. Edwards Lumber & Land Co. v. Smith, 191 N.C. 619, 132
S.E. 593 (1926) (decision is questionable because there was no mention of
tender).
'3 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1938).
01 Id. at 610.
'0 d. at 610.
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of this lease elect to purchase said property at the sum of $6,-
700,"0" the court held that tender of the purchase price was not
necessary for acceptance and need only be made when the owner
tenders the deed. In Crotts v. Thomas9 7 an option in a lease gave
the tenant the right to buy "30 acres more or less" during the lease
at not more than 150 dollars an acre, and the court held that where
the buyer is ready, willing, and able to pay the price and notifies
the vendor of his election to exercise the option, the vendor is under
a duty to tender a deed; the buyer need only tender the money
when such tender is made.
The importance of specifying the means of acceptance in plain
language is evident in North Carolina. If tender is expected, the
safe practice would be to state in the option that acceptance shall
be exercised by notice and tender of payment. If tender is to await
the delivery of the deed, the option should so state. In most cases,
where the option contains no clear provision for method of accep-
tance, the optionee takes a risk if he does not tender cash.
Even when tender is required, it may be excused in certain
situations. The optionee is not required to do a vain thing; thus,
tender is not necessary if the maker has given notice that he will
not honor the option, or if the property has been sold to a third
party."s The maker, for his own benefit, may waive tender (or
other requirement, including the time), even by parol. In such case,
notice of acceptance without tender is sufficient to bind the bargain.
In Johnson v. Noles29 the court said that since the extension of
OId. at 373, 85 S.E.2d at 318.
"226 N.C. 385, 38 S.E.2d 158 (1946). See Phelps v. Davenport, 151
N.C. 22, 65 S.E. 459 (1909); Hardy v. Ward, 150 N.C. 385, 64 S.E. 171
(1909). In Tyndall v. Tyndall, 245 N.C. 94, 95 S.E.2d 276 (1956), the
price depended upon the amount of medical bills, an amount within the
knowledge of the vendor, who refused to give the information. The court
ruled that tender was not necessary.
os Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge, 257 N.C. 388, 126 S.E.2d 167 (1962)
(maker disavowed the option agreement); Millikan v. Simmons, 244 N.C.
195, 93 S.E.2d 59 (1956); Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N.C. 178, 87 S.E.2d
258 (1955) ; Penny v. Nowell, 231 N.C. 154, 56 S.E.2d 428 (1949) ; Johnson
v. Noles, 224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E.2d 637 (1944); Samonds v. Cloninger, 189
N.C. 610, 127 S.E. 706 (1925); Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E.
168 (1914) (owner sells to third party); Gaylord v. McCoy, 161 N.C. 685,
77 S.E. 959 (1913).
224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E.2d 637 (1944). See Dixson v. C. E. Johnson
Realty Co., 209 N.C. 354, 183 S.E. 382 (1936); Alston v. Connell, 140 N.C.
485, 53 S.E. 292 (1906). Cf. Millikan v. Simmons, 244 N.C. 195, 93 S.E.2d
59 (1956).
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time in which to tender was made at maker's request (by parol
without further consideration) to enable him to give a good deed
and since the optionee had relied on this extension, the maker
would not be heard to plead the Statute of Frauds.
In Parks v. Jacobs,0 0 the court held that the optionee's having
the money at his attorney's office and requesting the vendor to come
there to close the deal did not constitute tender. The vendor is not
required to go to a place selected by the buyer; rather, it is up to
the buyer to tender to the vendor. In the event the maker sells the
land to a third party before acceptance, tender is to be made to
the new owner. 10' Payments made as consideration for the option
ordinarily are not considered part of the purchase price."0 2
IX. ENCUMBRANCES
What is the effect of the maker's inability to give good title
because of encumbrances? If the option provides that the maker
is obligated to give whatever title he has, or is obligated only if he
has good title, then, of course, the optionee cannot hold him beyond
such agreement. If the option is for a consideration and it provides
that on acceptance the maker will give good title, a breach because
of an encumbrance should give the optionee an action for damages.
In some circumstances, it seems that the optionee may deduct from
the amount of the tender the value of the encumbrance and bind
the maker.'
0 3
When the encumbrance is discovered after exercise of the op-
tion, the rules of contract for sale should apply. In a situation
where the vendor seeks to enforce the contract, with the vendee's
pleading lack of good title as a defense for refusal to perform,
the contract will be enforced if the encumbrance can be removed
before delivery of the deed is required by using a portion of the
100259 N.C. 129, 129 S.E.2d 884 (1963).
... In tendering, may the optionee subtract the amount of an existing
mortgage? See 55 Am. Jm. Vendor & Purchaser § 41 (1946); 91 C.J.S.
Vendor and Purchaser §§ 259(d), 263, 265 (1955). If a building burns
before acceptance, may the optionee tender the full amount less the value of
the building? See 55 Am. JUR. Vendor & Purchaser § 41 (1946); Annot.,
23 A.L.R. 1225 (1923). Can tender be made to one of several tenants in
common? See Hudson v. Cozart, 179 N.C. 247, 102 S.E. 278 (1920).
102 Carolina Timber Co. v. Wells, 171 N.C. 262, 88 S.E. 327 (1916);
Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E. 168 (1914); Bateman v. Kramer
Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 248, 70 S.E. 474 (1911).
108 See 92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 270 (1955).
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purchase price; otherwise the vendee is not bound to accept an
encumbered title."'
X. OPTION As AN ENCUMBRANCE
An option itself is an encumbrance on land," 5 but if the option
is revocable, then the encumbrance can be removed by the maker's
revocation.'0 6
XI. RIGHT To ASSIGN
A revocable option, which is nothing more than an offer, gives
the optionee no interest in the land which is assignable. 1' 7 If the
option is irrevocable, then the optionee has sufficient interest in the
land to enable him to assign the option in the absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary. Such right is not dependent on the use of
the word "assigns." If the assignee gives notice to the maker and
performs all conditions precedent, specific performance will be
granted.'1
8
When a lease contains an option for the lessee to purchase the
property during the term of the lease, an assignment of the lease,
in the absence of a contrary intent of the parties, also conveys the
option to the assignee, and such right is not dependent on the use
of the word "assigns.""' In Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge,"0
04See 55 Am. JuR. Vendor & Purchaser § 41 (1946); 92 C.J.S.
Vendor & Purchaser §§ 259(d), 263, 265 (1955).
10091 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 4 (1955).
1004 AMmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.81 (Casner ed. 1952); 91 C.J.S.
Vendor & Purchaser § 4 (1955).
10' See 1 CORBIN §§ 56, 57, 418 (1958) ; 1 WILLISTON § 415; 6 AM. JuR.
2d Assignments § 20 & n.15 (1963).
10' Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge, 257 N.C. 388, 126 S.E.2d 167 (1962);
Pearson v. Millard, 150 N.C. 303, 63 S.E. 1053 (1909). See Chappell v.
Winslow, 144 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1944); Gulf States Creosoting Co. v.
Loving, 120 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1941); Harry's Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v.
Norburn, 230 N.C. 23, 51 S.E.2d 916 (1949); North Carolina Bank & Trust
Co. v. Williams, 201 N.C. 464, 160 S.E. 484 (1931); Durham Const. Co.
v. Wright, 189 N.C. 456, 127 S.E. 580 (1925); Guy v. Bullard, 178 N.C.
228, 100 S.E. 328 (1919); Atlantic & North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Atlantic
& N.C. Co., 147 N.C. 368, 61 S.E. 185 (1908) (a much cited decision). 3
WILLISTON §§ 415, 936; 1 CORBIN §§ 54, 57, 271; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 151-52, 155 (1932); Van Hecke, Assignability of an Option Contract,
28 W. VA. L. REv. 64 (1922); Annot., 38 A.L.R. 1162 (1925).
10. Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge, supra note 108; Pearson v. Millard,
supra note 108.
10257 N.C. 388, 126 S.E.2d 167 (1962). It seems that a sublessee is
not entitled, merely by virtue of the sublease, to enforce an option to pur-
chase contained in the lease; however the lessee may specifically assign the
option to the sublessee. Thus, it is important here to determine whether
the party is an assignee or a sublessee. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1034,
1048 (1956).
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the lease contained an option to purchase; it also provided that the
lessors should not sell the property during the term of the lease
to anyone other than the lessee. The court held that assignees of
the lessees could enforce the option and that the use of the word
"assigns" was not necessary for the assignment of either the lease
or the option. The provision by which the lessors agreed not to
sell to any persons other than the lessees was held to be merely an
affirmation of the option itself.
Since an option for the sale of land must be in writing, it follows
that an assignment must also be in writing. However, the Statute
of Frauds is not available as a defense to the maker in a suit by
the assignee."' If the option gives a privilege of credit, this privi-
lege is ordinarily considered personal and therefore not assignable.
Likewise other provisions of a personal nature are not assignable."
2
No special form or words of art are required for assignment
of an option, but the assignment must comply with the general
requirements for assigning a contract concerning land.13  Thus,
informal language may be sufficient. Whether the assignment
must be written on the original instrument is an open question,
with some authority in the affirmative. 4 As between the parties
and as to those with notice (as by recording), however, it would
seem that a separate instrument should suffice." 5 Where the assign-
.See Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N.C. 254 (1884); Love v. Cobb, 63 N.C.
324 (1869); Simms v. Killian, 34 N.C. 252 (1851). 2 CORBIN § 414; 3
WILLISTON § 430; Annot., 38 A.L.R. 1348 (1925).
... Chappell v. Winslow, 144 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1944) (vendor could
not assign); Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.
1941). In Durham Constr. Co. v. Wright, 189 N.C. 456, 127 S.E. 580
(1925), the court held that a contract to buy materials and superintend
construction of a building calls for personal service and is not assignable.
In Guy v. Bullard, 178 N.C. 228, 100 S.E. 328 (1919), a contract for the
purchase of a sawmill on condition that the buyer saw a certain amount of
lumber for the seller was held to be assignable. See Pearson v. Millard,
150 N.C. 303, 63 S.E. 1053 (1909); Atlantic & N.C. R.R. v. Atlantic &
N.C. Co., 147 N.C. 368, 61 S.E. 185 (1908). 3 WILLISTON §§ 412, 415; IA
CORBIN §§ 57, 271; Annot., 10 A.L.R. 653 (1921) ; Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1192
(1925); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1034, 1050 (1956). Harry's Cadillac-Pontiac
Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23, 51 S.E.2d (1949), holds that a contract for
sale is assignable even though a part of the purchase price was to be paid
by notes, and that the assignee can enforce the contract against the vendor.
This decision is questionable, for it requires the vendor to extend credit to
a stranger.
... See Morton v. Thornton, 259 N.C. 697, 131 S.E.2d 378 (1963);
Winberry v. Koonce, 83 N.C. 351 (1880); 3 WILLISTON §§ 424, 430.
... Cannaday v. Shepard, 55 N.C. 224 (1855); Estes v. Hairston, 12
N.C. 354 (1827).
... See 3 WILLISTON § 430; 6 Am. JUR. 2d Assignment § 86 (1963).
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ment is a gift to the assignee and the option instrument is delivered
to him, there is no apparent reason why the gift should not be en-
forced as between the assignee and the original maker (grantor-
owner)." In regard to notice to the maker and to third parties,
the recording laws are applicable, and a maker is not liable to an
assignee until he has actual or constructive notice of the assign-
ment.' 7 Where the assignment is made in one state and the
original option was made in another, questions of conflicts of laws
may arise."
8
XII. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
On valid acceptance by the optionee, the relationship between
the parties is that of vendor and vendee in a contract for sale of
land, normally a bilateral contract. For breach of the contract
for sale, an aggrieved party generally may at his election sue for
damages or seek specific performance." 9 Rescission or restitution
116 See Buchman v. Smith, 140 N.J. Eq. 390, 54 A.2d 775 (1947); In re
Huggins' Estate, 204 Pa. 167, 53 Atl. 746 (1902) ; Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash.
231, 91 Pac. 950 (1907); 3 WILLISTON §§ 438A-40; 4 CoRBN §§ 909-21; RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 150-77 (1932).
"" On notice, see Lipe v. Guilford Nat'l Bank, 236 N.C. 328, 72
S.E.2d 759 (1952); Page Trust Co. v. Carolina Constr. Co., 191 N.C. 664,
132 S.E. 804 (1926); Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. McNair & Pearsall,
138 N.C. 326, 51 S.E. 949 (1905); Anniston Nat'l Bank v. School Comm.,
118 N.C. 383, 24 S.E. 792 (1896); Ellis v. Amason, 17 N.C. 273 (1832).
See generally 3 WILLISTON, §§ 433-35, 437; Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 172
(1926); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 171 (1934); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1301 (1936)
(recording assignments of mortgages); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937).
11. Grace v. Hannah, 51 N.C. 94 (1858); Reddick v. Jones, 28 N.C. 107
(1845); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS §§ 348-54 (1934); 3 WILLISTON § 446;
Annot., 31 A.L.R. 876, 883 (1924); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 774, 778 (1937);
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 486 (1958).
1. Crawford v. Allen, 189 N.C. 434, 127 S.E. 521 (1925) (damages);
Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 97 S.E. 654 (1918) (specific perfor-
mance); Jones v. Jones, 148 N.C. 358, 62 S.E. 417 (1908) (specific per-
formance as matter of right); Shakespeare v. Caldwell Land & Lumber Co.,
144 N.C. 516, 57 S.E. 213 (1907) (specific performance); Whitted v.
Fuquay, 127 N.C. 68, 37 S.E. 141 (1900) (specific performance); Shaw
v. Vincent, 64 N.C. 690 (1870) (specific performance where the plaintiff
has substantially performed); Gordon v. Brown, 39 N.C. 399 (1846) (specific
performance where there is a penalty provision). 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 11.66-.81 (Casner ed. 1952). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§
327, 358-80 (1932); 5 CORBIN §§ 1097-98, 1143-45. Annot., 32 A.L.R. 584
(1924); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 887 (1935) (penalty provision as affecting
specific performance); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1336 (1925) (stipulated damages);
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1511 (1928) (measure of damages); Annot., 54 A.L.R.
1355 (1928) (lessee refuses to take possession); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1253,
1508 (1928) (substantial performance); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 7 (1930)
(specific performance as matter of right); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 900 (1932)
(abatement in price where not fully performed); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 1493
(1935) (penalty provision).
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lies for fraud, duress, mistake, undue influence, mental incompe-
tence, or default by one party,120 and, also, of course, by mutual
consent. 121 Damages and specific performance are remedies based
on an affirmance of the contract, and they are therefore not incon-
sistent, whereas rescission, since it destroys the contract, is incon-
sistent with any remedy affirming it.122 If an election is made to
sue for damages rather than specific performance, and third parties
are affected, the actor may not be allowed to change his mind and
later seek specific performance.'
23
An option contract is specifically enforceable between the parties
without recording,124 as are other instruments. Options are subject
to the recording statutes in general, and to General Statutes section
47-18 in particular.'
25
. 0 Orrey v. McFadyen, 165 N.C. 237, 81 S.E. 296 (1914); Sten v.
Benbow, 151 N.C. 460, 66 S.E. 445 (1909); Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C.
562, 53 S.E. 337 (1906).
, Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 53 S.E. 337 (1906). See Harwell v.
Rohrabacher, 243 N.C. 255, 90 S.E.2d 499 (1955); Scott v. Jordan, 235
N.C. 244, 69 S.E.2d 557 (1952). In Bell v. Brown, 227 N.C. 319, 42 S.E.2
92 (1947), an optionee holding an option at a set price for the purchase
of a house then under construction requested material changes in house
which would increase the cost. The court held that the vendor was entitled
to treat this as a rescission. On rescission, see generally 3 AMERICAN LAWN
or PRoPERTY § 11.70,.71 (Casner ed. 1952); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 189 (1929);
Annot., 102 A.L.R. 852 (1936); Annot., 106 A.L.R. 125 (1937); Annot., 134
A.L.R. 1064 (1941); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 582 (1943).
... Lowe v. Hall, 227 N.C. 541, 42 S.E.2d 670 (1947).
.. Dennis v. Dixon, 209 N.C. 199, 183 S.E. 360 (1936).
"Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N.C. 62, 47 S.E.2d 528 (1948) (dicta).
See Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939); Hargrove v.
Adcock, 111 N.C. 166, 16 S.E. 16 (1892).
"Eller v. Arnold, 230 N.C. 418, 53 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
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